Unconditionally secure bit commitment and coin flipping are known to be impossible in the classical world. Bit commitment is known to be impossible also in the quantum world. We introduce a related new primitive -quantum bit escrow. In this primitive Alice commits to a bit b to Bob. The commitment is bindingin the sense that if Alice is asked to reveal the bit, Alice can not bias her commitment without having a good probability of being detected cheating. The commitment is sealing in the sense that if Bob learns information about the encoded bit, then if later on he is asked to prove he was playing honestly, he is detected cheating with a good probability. Rigorously proving the correctness of quantum cryptographic protocols has proved to be a difficult task. We develop techniques to prove quantitative statements about the binding and sealing properties of the quantum bit escrow protocol.
INTRODUCTION
We start with an informal definition of a (very) weak variant of bit commitment. In this variant there is first a commitment stage in which Alice commits a bit b to Bob. Later on there is a reveal stage in which Alice reveals the bit and Bob proves he played honestly. The protocol should be binding in the sense that if Alice changes her mind at revealing time then Bob has a good probability of catching her cheating, and sealing in the sense that if Bob learns information about the committed bit then Alice has a good probability of catching him cheating. Thus, the fundamental (and only) difference between this primitive and bit commitment is that in bit commitment Bob can not learn from the encoding any information about b, while in the weak primitive Bob can learn a lot of information about the encoded bit, but if he does so Alice catches him cheating with a good probability. • (Binding) If Alice tries to change her mind about the value of b, then there is non zero probability that an honest Bob would reject.
DEFINITION 1. (Weak bit commitment) A weak bit commitment protocol is a quantum communication protocol between Alice and Bob which consists of two stages

• (Sealing) If Bob attempts to learn information about the deposited bit b, then there is non zero probability that an honest Alice would reject.
Later on, we will give more formal definitions of "Alice changing her mind" and "Bob learning information", and 
To deposit bit b, Alice picks a random x E {0, 1}, and sends Cb,x to Bob. Later on, one of the following two challenges is issued: * Either Alice is asked to reveal the deposited bit, and then Alice sends the classical bits b and z to Bob 1 Bob measures ¢ according to the basis {¢0,x, ¢1,x} and verifies that the result of the measurement is ¢b,x.
• Or Bob is asked to return the deposited qubit, he returns a qubit q, and Alice measures it in the {¢0,~, ¢1,x} basis and verifies that it is Cb,~.
We rigorously define and prove: THEOREM 1. Protocol 1 has the following properties:
• The deposited qubit does not reveal, in an information theoretic sense, all the information about the deposited bit b.
• (Binding) When Bob asks Alice to reveal the classical bit b that she deposited, if Alice influences the value of b with advantage e then she is detected cheating with probability ~(c 2).
•
(Sealing) When Alice challenges Bob to return the deposited qubit, then if Bob can predict b with advantage e then he is detected cheating with probability ~(e2).
Protocol 1 and Theorem 1 do not achieve the goal set in definition 1 of weak bit commitment. Definition 1 asks for a protocol that is both binding and sealing, i.e., a commitment s.t. if either player cheats he is detected cheating with a good probability. Protocol 1 and Theorem 1 only give a commitment that is either binding (if Alice has to reveal) or 1This means that when Bob gets the qubit qb that is supposed to carry a classical value for b, Bob measures qb first in the {10), [1)} basis. We carry this convention throughout the paper.
sealing (if Bob has to return the qubit), but not simultaneously both. We therefore catll this protocol a bit escrow protocol. The question of achieving simultaneous binding and sealing i.e. a weak bit commitment protocol, is left open. This question was addressed in [3] , who independently defined the binding and sealing properties, and we discuss it in section 1.2.
We describe soon how to use the first two properties in Theorem 1 to get a biased coin flipping protocol with a constant bias.
Quantum Coin flipping
Alice and Bob are going through a divorce. They want to decide by at coin flip over the phone who is going to keep the car. The problem is that they do not trust each other any more. Classical coin flipping can be implemented either by a trusted party or by assuming players with limited computattional power and some cryptographic assumptions. However, if the players have unlimited computational power then no coin flipping protocol is possible in a classical world. This is because any protocol represents a two player game, atnd therefore game theory tells us that there is a player with an always winning strategy. 'By contrast, in the quantum setting coin flipping (without computational assumptions) is not a priori ruled out. This is because any attempt by a player to measure extra information by deviating from the protocol can disturb the quantum state, and therefore be detected by the other player. This leads Lo and Chau [5] and later Matyers et. al. [7] to consider quantum coin flipping. There are several ways to define quantum coin flipping when cheaters can be detected. 
Lo and Chau [5] showed that there is no quantum coin flipping protocol with 0 bias, under a certain restriction ("ideal coin flipping".) Mayers et al [7] generalized their proof to the general 0 bias case. Lo and Chau leave open the question whether non-exact protocols exist. Mayers et al [7] suggest at quantum coin flipping protocol that is based on a biased-coin protocol that is repeated many times. Mayers et al prove thatt it works well against some strong, nattural attacks. However, no general proof is given or claimed for the coin-flipping protocol or the biased-coin sub-protocol. We give a simple protocol for quantum biased coin flipping, with constant bias. It is a modification of protocol 1: Based on the properties of protocol 1 we can prove that no player can fully control the game: THEOREM 2. Protocol 2 has 6 < 0.42 bias.
i.e., no player can force his result with probability greater than 0.92. We note that while our protocol is resilient against all powerful malicious quantum players, it requires only simple single qubit operations from the honest player. An intriguing question is whether quantum coin flipping protocols are possible for arbitrarily low biases.
Weak Bit Commitment?
Hardy and Kent [3] (see Section 1.3) noticed that Protocol 1 can be used to give a weak bit commitment .protocol if Alice and Bob can access a random independent coin flip. This is done as follows: at revealing time Alice first reveals the bit b, and then they receive a random independent coin flip. If the coin is 0, Bob is challenged to convince Alice that he hasn't been cheating, and if the coin flip turns out to be 1, then Alice is challenged. This is still correct if the coin flip is biased, as long as both probabilities for 0 and for 1 are constant.
Since we already have a biased coin flipping protocol, we might consider using this biased coin flipping protocol combined with the bit escrow protocol to give a weak bit commitment protocol. Consider the following protocol (see Figure being detected cheating in the bit-escrow protocol and winning the biased coin flipping protocol, in such a way that the cheater is never challenged when he (or she) has positive probability of being detected. It is our hope that our techniques could be extended to give weak bit commitment with f~(e c) binding 0:nd sealing for some constant c. Our results also show that Protocol 3 cannot be more than ~2(e 2) sealing or binding. It might be interesting to find a protocol that does better, or prove that such a protocol does not exist. It seems that a weak bit commitment protocol with better than quadratic security parameters can be used repeatedly to give a secure coin flipping protocol with unbounded bias.
Related Work
Some of the work presented here was independently done by Hardy and Kent [3] . They independently defined the binding and sealing properties and the weak bit commitment primitive (giving it different names). The protocol they analyze is similar in structure to protocol 3. Hardy and Kent's result asserts that a protocol similar to Protocol 3 is simultaneously sealing and binding. I.e., if Alice (Bob) uses a strategy that gives her (him) ~ advantage, then Alice (Bob) is detected cheating with some probability which is strictly greater than 0 (they do not analyze the dependence of the detection probability on e). However, no proof is given regarding the security against a cheater who tries to correlate the two parts of the protocol to his (or her) advantage.
PRELIMINARIES
The model. Let {el,... ,e2~} be an orthonormal basis for C n, and let [i) =lil,... ,i,~) be the vector ei. A pure state over n qubits is a vector v C I1J e" of norm 1. Any pure state Iv) can be expressed as Iv) = 2+aili), with ~ilail e = 1. A mixed state is a classical distribution over pure states, {pi,¢i}, where 0 <pl < 1, Eipl = 1 and ¢i is a pure state, and the interpretation we give it is that the system is with probability pi in the pure state ¢i. A quantum system is, in general, in a mixed state. The system Alice builds in the first stage of Protocol 2 is in a mixed state that is with 1 in some pure state ¢b,~. probabifity 7 A quantum system can undergo two basic operations: unitary evolution and measurement.
Unitar,y evolution : If a unitary transformation U :
C e ~-* C e~ is applied to a pure stkte ¢, then the new state of the system is the pure state U¢. If U is applied to the mixture {pi, ¢i} then the new state of the system is the mixture {pi, U¢i}. The interpretation we give it is that with probability pi the system was in the pure state ¢i hence it is now in the pure state U¢i.
Orthogonal Measurements : An orthogonal measurement is a decomposition of the system into orthogonal subspaces. More formally, suppose the system is in a super position ¢ E C e~. Suppose 7-/1,...,:Hk are orthogonal subspaces, and C 2~ = 7-ll (9 ... G :Hk. A measurement of ¢ according to the decomposition :H1,... ,7-/k, will get result i (or :Hi) with probability qi = lIIT~,l¢)l e where I17~, is the projection on subspace :Hi, and then the state will collapse to ~(II7~,1¢). In other words, ¢ falls into the subspace :Hi with probability which is the length of the projection squared, and the new vector is the normalized projected vector. An orthogonal measurement can be represented using an Hermitian matrix M whose eigenspaces are the subspaces :Hi. A measurement of a mixture is the mixture of the measurements of the pure states.
n
Given a system do on C , one can use an ancilla, say 10,... ,0) E <1~ e , apply a unitary transformation U : C 2~ ®C em ~ C e~ ®C era, and then an orthogonal measurement on ¢?" @ C e'~. It turns out that this is the most general measurement possible. There are several equivalent ways to formulate this so called 'generalized measurement', and we refer the interested reader to [8] .
The Density Matrix. The density matrix of a pure state 1¢) is the matrix 1¢)(¢[, where (¢[ = ((¢)t). is the conjugate transpose of ¢. For example, the density matrix of ¢0,0 is
The density matrix of a mixed state {pi, ¢i} is ~ipilq~i)(q~il. All density matrices are Hermitian, positive semi-definite and have trace 1. If a unitary matrix U operates on the system, it transforms the density matrix p to UpU t. A measurement M operating on a system whose density matrix is p results in an expected outcome Trace(Mp).
Distinguishing Between Density Matrices. Given a quantum system p and a generalized measurement O on it, let pO denote the classical distribution on the possible results that we get by measuring p according to O. i.e., it is some classical distribution pl,... ,Pk where we get result i with probability pi. Given two different mixed states, we can ask how well one can distinguish between the two mixtures. We need a measure for the distance between two classical distributions and we choose the 11 norm: Locality. We now turn to the local view of a subsystem. Suppose we are in a mixed state p over k + m qubits, where Alice holds the first k qubits A and Bob holds the last m qubits B. Assume that Alice applies a generalized measurement O on her qubits A. This induces a new density matrix pO on B. E.g., if Alice and Bob were in the super position ¢ = -~(100) + Ill)) over two qubits and Alice measured the second qubit according to the basis {[0), I1)}, then Bob is 1 in the super position I0) and with probwith probability 1 in I1), hence pB ° 0 = 1 . A fundamental ability ~ ~-fact from physics, which can also be proven rigorously, tells us that in fact p~ does not depend on O, but only on the original matrix p. We thus denote it by PlB, and call it the density matrix p reduced onto the subsystem B. Alternatively, we say that the rest of the system is traced out. The physical interpretation of the above result is that a player is guaranteed locality, i.e., a player Bob who holds a subsystem B knows that the results he gets from measurements he applies on B do not depend on the way the system outside B evolves. It is also some kind of commitment. If Alice sends Bob k qubits that have reduced density matrix PB, then whatever Alice later does can not change this reduced density matrix.
Purification. A density matrix on a Hilbert space A can always be viewed as a reduced density matrix of a pure state on a larger Hilbert space, a process which is called "purification". A pure state I¢)A,B is a purification of the density matrix PA if the reduced density matrix of I¢)(¢IA,B to the Hilbert space A is p. The most straight forward way to purify a density matrix p = ~-~i wil¢i)(¢il is by the state
I¢) = E~ v'-~li) ® I¢,).
Fidelity. The fidelity is a way to measure distances between density matrices, which is an alternative to the trace metric. Given two density matrices p0, pl on the same Hilbert space A the fidelity is defined [4] to be:
where the supremum is taken over all purifications 1¢0) of p0 and I¢1) of pl to the same dimensional Hilbert space. We note here a few important properties which can easily be proven:
For p0 which is a pure state, i.e. p0 ----1¢0)(¢0h we have f(po,Pl)= (¢olP~1¢0).
Note that the fidelity increases as the distance between two density matrices decreases. It is also not too difficult to see that the supremum is always achieved, i.e. we can replace the supremum by a maxirhum; See [4] for more details.
Entanglement. Suppose Alice holds a register A, Bob holds B, and the system is in a pure state CAB. If we look at Bob's system alone then we might see a mixed state, and as we said before, Alice can not change the reduced density matrix of Bob by local operations on her side. On the other hand Alice might gain different aspects of knowledge on the actual result that Bob gets. EXAMPLE 1. CAB = 2(100)+111)). lfAlice measures in the {10), 11)} basis, then Bob's system is with probability half in the state 10), and with probability half in the state 11>, and the register A reflects the result Bob gets, i.e., Alice knows whether Bob gets a zero or a one. Now, CAB can also be rep- I.e., even though Alicecan not change Bob's reduced density matrix, she can determine how to "open" the mixture, and do so in a way that gives her full knowledge of Bob's result.
THE BINDING PROPERTY
In Protocol 1 Alice sends a qubit to Bob (we call it a "deposit" step) and later on she tells Bob how to "open" the qubit (the "reveal" step) which also determines the value that is supposed to be in the qubit. Such a protocol is worthless unless the deposit step is "binding" Alice to a pre-determined value. We first define the binding property in a general way. We then is. Suppose we have a two Let us denote by p0 the probability that Alice claims the result is 0 in the zero strategy, by pl the probability that Alice claims the result is 1 in the zero strategy, and by p~,~ the probability that Bob decides the answer is rB : err when Alice uses the zero strategy. We similarly define qo, ql, q~r for the one strategy.
DEFINITION 5. ((e, ~/) binding) A protocol is (e, 7) binding, if whenever Bob is honest, for any strategy Alice uses, i] p .... q~ <_ e then IPo -qo l, lPl -ql] ~ 7-
Protocol 1 is quadratically binding
2___~__ ~ binding. THEOREM 5. Protocol 1 is (e, 7 = ¢o~(20) J
PaOOF. (of Theorem 5). At deposit time Alice sends Bob one qubit B, which might be entangled with the qubits A that Alice holds. Let us denote the reduced density matrix of B by p. At revealing time, Alice may choose whether she wants to bias the result towards 0, in which case she applies the generalized measurement M0, or towards 1 in which case she applies M1. The measurements 3//o and M1 do not change the reduced density matrix p of Bob, but rather give different ways to realize p as a mixture of purestates, and give Alice information about the value that Bob actually gets to see in this mixture. Now, we even go further and give Alice complete freedom to choose the way she realizes the reduced density matrix p of Bob as a mixture, and we give her the knowledge of Bob's value for free. Let us say that when Alice applies M0, the reduced density matrix p is realized as the mixture {pi, ¢i}, and when Alice applies M1 the reduced density matrix p is realized as the mixture {p~, ¢~}. Now, let us focus on the zero strategy. Say Alice realizes p as {pi, ¢i}. When the i'th event happens, Alice's strategy tells her to send some two qubits qb, qx to Bob, that are supposed to hold classical 0, 1 values for b and x. Bob then measures qb and q~ in the {10),[1)} basis. Now, if one of qb, q~ is not a classical bit, then Alice can measure it herself in the {10), I1)} basis, and get a mixture over classical bits. Furthermore, we can push all the probabilistic decisions into the mixture {pi, ¢i}. Thus, w.l.o.g, we can assume Alice's answers qb and qz are classical bits that are determined by the event i. Let us denote by ui the vector ¢5i,x, where bi,xi are Alice's answers when event i occurs. W.l.o.g we may assume u~ ~ {¢b,=}, otherwise we know Bob immediately rejects. The probability Bob discovers that Alice is cheating is then 1 -[(¢i [u,>] e and the overall probability Bob detects Alice is cheating is p~. --~p,(1-I(¢~lu,>l =) Let us define the density matrix po = Z~p~luO(u~l. 
<_ ~X/S,pi(1 --I<¢,lu,>l =)
Similarly, if Alice tries to bias the result towards 1, B ends up in the mixture {P~,¢I}, and when ¢~ occurs Alice sends b',x' to Bob that correspond to a vector u~ E {¢b,=}. We define pl to be the reduced density matrix Pl : Sip~lu~)(u~[. As before, lip-pill* < 2 qv"qT;7. Hence, lip0-p, ll, <_ 2( pv~T,-+ q4~7;;~-).
To conclude the proof, we establish the following claim: CLAIM 7. Let po and pl be density matrices corresponding to mixtures over {¢b,=}. Let po be the probability of ¢0,0 or ¢o.1 in the first mixture, and pl = 1-po be the probability of ¢1,0 or ¢1,1. Similarly let qo and ql be the corresponding quantities .for the second mixture. Then Ilpo -P~II* >-2. Ipo -qol cos20.
PROOF. We show that we can distinguish the mixtures with probability at least IPo -q0lcos 20 when we measure them according to the basis {10), I1)}. If we do the measurement on a qubit whose state is the reduced density matrix p0 we get the [0) answer with probability p0 cos 2 (0)+pl sin e (0), while if we do the measurement on a qubit whose state is the reduced density matrix pl we get the 10) answer with probability q0 cose(0) + q~ sin e (0). The difference is tPo cose(0) + pa sine(P) -(qo cose(0) + ql sine(P))[ = Ipo -qol(cose(O) -sin e (0)), where we used pl -ql = (1 -po) -(1 -qo) = qoE-po.
Altogether we get I lpo -p~ II, >-2. Ipo -qo I(cos e (0)-sin ~ (8) 
A Quadratic Strategy for Alice
We now show that Alice has a quadratic strategy for Protocol 1, and thus Theorem 5 is essentially tight. In fact, we show the quadratic bound for a more general family of protocols. Let po, pl be two density matrices of the same dimension, p0 can be realized as the mixture {p0, [a01} ' and pl as {p!, ]a~)}. To encode b, honest Alice picks [ai) with probability p~ and sends it to Bob. At revealing time Alice sends b and i to Bob, and Bob tests whether Alice is cheating by projecting his state on ]ab). Hence, the probability Alice sends b = 0 in the zero strategy = ~-(c +,~+2cs(¢01¢~>)= ½0 +2c~vq).
We conclude:
CLAIM 9. Alice's advantage is v~sin(2a) 2
We now prove that the detection probability is at most ,~(c + vqs)l¢0) + VY-=-Tsl¢0 ~)
The rest of the protocol involves Alice's rotation of the state by U0, then Alice's measurement of the register A and Bob's measurement of the register B. The entire process can be treated as a generalized measurement on this state, where this measurement is a projection onto one of two subspaces, the "cheating Alice" and the "Honest Alice" subspaces. We know that [¢0) hes entirely in the honest Alice subspace, and thus the probability that Alice is caught, conditioned 1 1 rl -f)s 2 that C was projected on ¢~, is at most ~ In the same way, when we condition on a projection on ¢~, We show here that protocol 1 is quadratically sealing. This means that whatever Bob does, he will always be detected cheating with probability which is at least the square of his advantage. Later, we show that this is tight. PROOF. We first describe a general scenario. Alice is honest and sends Ieb,x)A to Bob. Bob has an aneilla 10)c. Bob applies some unitary transformation U acting on the registers A and C. Let us denote
Protocol 1 is Quadratically Sealing
[Olb,x) = U(leb,x, O)AC)
Bob then sends register A to Alice, and keeps register C to himself. We want to show that if C contains much information about b then Alice detects Bob cheating with a good probability. We can express c~b,~ as a superposition, I~,.> = Ieb,~,~,x> + I¢~,~,w~,~>
where we have used the basis Ieb,x), [e-b,,), for A. In this representation, the probability p Bob is caught cheating is: b~x which in particular implies that II~;,x[[ < 2v%
We now want to express Bob's advantage. Let p0 (pl) be the reduced density matrix of the register B conditioned on the event that b = 0 (b = 1). Then, PROOF. (of Lemma). We will prove that all the unprimed w vectors lie in one bunch of small width, using the unitarity of U. The unitarity of g implies that (¢b,~leb',x') ----(~b,xI~b',x'). We can express c%,~ as in Equation 3. We get: is a weaker than the result which we want to achieve in lemma 11, which is closeness to 1 up to order p terms. If we stop here, the closeness of the unprimed w vectors up to order V'P implies that Bob's information is at most of the order of 4v~. Note, however, that so far all we have used is unitarity, and we have not used the particular properties of the set of vectors we use in the protocol. In the rest of the proof, we will use the symmetry in protocol 1 to improve on this partial result, and to show that Bob's information is at most of the order of v/~. Basically, the symmetry which we will use is the fact that the vectors in the protocol can be paired into orthogonal vectors.
We proceed as follows. The idea is to express equations 9-12 as inequalities involving only the distances between two w vectors, IlWb,~ --Wb',x'll and then to solve the set of the four inequalities to give an upper bound on the pairwise distances. This will imply a bound on the inner products, where the third inequality is true due to equation 6. Similarly, we have the same lower bound for I(w0,11w~,0)l, which implies lemma 11.
Thus, our bit escrow protocol gives quadratic sealing. proof.-Alice prepares an encoding eb of b • {0, 1} in register B, and sends register B to Bob. Let pb be the reduced density matrix of eb to register B. We denote t = 1100 -o~llt.
By Theorem 3 we know that if Bob is interested in learning information about b, and is not concerned with being detected cheating, the best he can do is a measurement according to the eigenvalue basis of P0 -Pl-Given, any 0 < p < 1 we modify this strategy to a strategy where the detection probability is at most p, and yet, Bob gets much information. Let us consider more precisely Bob's best strategy for learning b if he is not concerned with being caught. Let {el,... ,eK} be the eigenvector basis of p0 -01. Let V + (V-) be the set of eigenvectors e with non-negative (negative) eigenvalues. The measurement M is defined by the Hermitian matrix for which V + is an eigenspace of eigenvalue 0 and V-is an eigenspace of eigenvalue 1. By Theorem 3
To apply a weak form of the measurement M, Bob takes a one qubit ancilla C. He applies a unitary transformation U on the received message and the ancilla, as follows:
where Iv) = lv/i--z~-pl0 ) + v'~ll) and U is completed to a unitary transformation. After applying U Bob returns register B to Alice, and keeps the ancilla C for himself. Notice that the special case p = 1 is equivalent to the measurement M. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We show that no cheater can control the game. 
